03__DUFFY.DOC

12/6/2007 8:49:14 AM

Notes
REALITY CHECK:
HOW PRACTICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
AFFECT THE INTERPRETATION OF
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER
JOHN C. DUFFY†
ABSTRACT
This Note examines the treatment of depraved indifference murder
across the thirty-six states that include the concept in their criminal
codes. The Note identifies the broad range of practical circumstances
that shape the development of depraved indifference murder statutes,
and argues that it is not possible to develop a single interpretation that
will function effectively across all jurisdictions. Finally, this Note
identifies the three most important practical circumstances that affect
the development of depraved indifference murder statutes.

INTRODUCTION
Depraved indifference murder is an anomaly in the field of
criminal law. Although criminal codes generally place a premium on
clarity to inform potential defendants of the types of conduct that will
be subject to punishment, many depraved indifference murder
statutes include such vague concepts as “depraved heart”1 or
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1. Alan C. Michaels, Note, Defining Unintended Murder, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 786, 787
(1985) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *199).
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2
“extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Some states
provide a more structured definition of depraved indifference that
focuses on the defendant’s subjective state of mind3 or the degree of
4
risk created by the defendant’s conduct, but these interpretations
vary widely by jurisdiction.
In February 2003, fifty-two-year-old administrative law judge
Larry Feingold disabled the pilot lights of his oven, turned on the gas,
ingested tranquilizers, and fell asleep in an attempt to commit
5
suicide. During this attempt, a spark from the refrigerator ignited the
gas, triggering an explosion that blew out the walls of his apartment.6
Feingold was charged with first-degree reckless endangerment,7
which, in New York, requires that the defendant “evinc[e] a depraved
8
indifference to human life.” Although this was a reckless
endangerment case, the Court of Appeals of New York seized the
opportunity to address the state’s interpretation of “depraved
indifference” as applied to its depraved indifference murder statute.9
The opinion culminated a line of cases altering the state’s
interpretation of depraved indifference murder from an objective to a
subjective approach.10 This opinion, however, reveals only two of the
many approaches to depraved indifference murder. Unlike New
York, Colorado interprets its depraved indifference murder statute
according to the number of lives endangered by the defendant’s
actions,11 whereas Utah evaluates depraved indifference murder
12
based on the risk of death created by the defendant’s conduct.
This Note provides a framework for states to adopt a definition
of depraved indifference murder that effectively corresponds with the
practical realities of their jurisdictions. To create this framework, this
Note examines the approaches taken by the thirty-six states that

2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
3. See infra Part II.E.
4. See infra Part II.B–C.
5. People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (N.Y. 2006).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2004).
9. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d at 1164 (“To begin with, there is no dispute that the term
‘depraved indifference’ has the same meaning in both the depraved indifference murder statute
and the reckless endangerment statute.”).
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. See infra Part III.D.
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include the concept of depraved indifference in their criminal codes.
Unlike other investigations, which have been largely theoretical in
nature, this Note sheds light on the practical realities that shape a
state’s interpretation of depraved indifference murder. It summarizes
the different approaches to depraved indifference murder across the
country and identifies the practical reasons behind each state’s
selection of a particular interpretation and the consequences of that
choice. Given the diversity of practical circumstances that lead to the
selection of a particular mode of interpretation, it is not possible to
provide an “ideal” analysis of depraved indifference that works in
every jurisdiction. But by closely evaluating the reasons for adhering
to a particular interpretive methodology and the consequences that
stem from this choice, states can follow the approach that best fits
their individual circumstances. This Note identifies the three most
important practical factors that a state must consider when selecting
an interpretive approach.
Part I examines the foundations of the depraved indifference
murder concept and highlights influential commentary on the subject.
Part II provides a summary of the methodologies that are followed in
all thirty-six states that recognize the depraved indifference concept
and demonstrates the practical consequences that result from each
particular interpretive choice. Part III illustrates how previous
analyses of depraved indifference murder fail to evaluate the practical
realities leading to a state’s choice of an interpretive methodology.
This Part demonstrates that practical realities play a major role in a
state’s selection of its approach to depraved indifference murder by
examining the formation of the interpretive scheme toward depraved
indifference murder in five states. Part IV analyzes the results in Parts
II and III and provides recommendations on how states can best
utilize this information to select an interpretive approach to depraved
indifference murder that corresponds with their unique practical
circumstances.
I. BACKGROUND
At common law, murder included the killing of a human being by
another human being with malice aforethought.13 The concept of
“malice aforethought” developed during the Enlightenment, when

13. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 772 (2d ed. 2004) (“[M]urder came to
include all homicides committed with ‘malice aforethought’ . . . .”).
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criminal conduct was evaluated on reason rather than the religious
14
concept of sin. Malice constituted “any evil design in general; the
dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart . . . ,”15 a disdain
16
for social relations and for the political order.
The concept of malice aforethought was divided into “express”
and “implied” malice. As a result, the common law definition of
unintentional murder encompassed two types of killings: those that
were not premeditated or deliberate but were done as the result of an
17
intentional act and those that were based on a level of recklessness
displaying a “depraved heart.”18 According to Professor V.F. Nourse,
“The murder of a depraved heart developed, at least in part, as a
killing that was unprompted by an aggressor or provocateur; there
was no relation, societal or legal, that prompted the murder.”19 In its
early development, depraved heart murder, like much of the common
law, was based on morality, aiming to punish those offenders who
committed acts so reckless that they violated all social and political
norms.20
In 1962, the law of murder changed drastically with the
development of the Model Penal Code (MPC).21 The Model Penal
Code abandoned the “malice aforethought” and “depraved heart”
22
language of common law murder, instead defining the offense along
the four culpability levels of section 2.02: “purposely,” “knowingly,”

14. V.F. Nourse, Hearts and Minds: Understanding the New Culpability, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 361, 372 (2002).
15. Michaels, supra note 1, at 787 (quoting Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 447
(Pa. 1946)).
16. Nourse, supra note 14, at 375.
17. Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 1003
(1998) (“What we would now call intent to kill, purpose or knowledge in the language of the
Model Penal Code, became known as ‘actual’ or ‘express’ malice, which was the basis for one
type of murder.”).
18. Id. (“Some killings that were not purposeful or knowing, however, were added to the
murder category under the rubric of ‘implied’ malice, including a category of ‘depraved heart’
murders, and were treated the same as knowing killings.” (citation omitted)).
19. Nourse, supra note 14, at 376.
20. See id. (“One spoke of an abandoned heart in such a context precisely because ‘no
person, unless of an abandoned heart, would be guilty of such an act upon a slight or no
apparent cause.’” (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *200)).
21. See BONNIE, supra note 13, app. A, at A-1 (“[T]he [American Law] Institute published
the Model Penal Code in 1962.”).
22. Nourse, supra note 14, at 371 (“Modern drafters rejected the idea of a ‘depraved heart’
because they saw this phrase as a sentimental, ambiguous, holdover of an ancient common
law.”).
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23
“recklessly,” and “negligently.” The MPC defines “extreme
indifference” murder as a homicide that “is committed recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
24
human life.” The commentary to section 210.2(1)(b) of the Model
Penal Code indicates that the drafters intended extreme indifference
murder to define a homicide that falls short of the mens rea required
25
26
for “knowingly,” but is more severe than manslaughter. Despite
this description, the drafters did not provide a definition for the
phrase “extreme indifference to the value of human life.”27 Instead,
they opted to leave that determination to the trier of fact, instructing
that “recklessness that can fairly be assimilated to purpose or
knowledge should be treated as murder and that less extreme
28
recklessness should be punished as manslaughter.” This construction
has produced a great deal of criticism because the drafters’
explanation of extreme indifference seems no clearer than the
common law concept of a depraved heart.29 As a result, states are left
to make their own determinations of the meaning of extreme
indifference, producing a wide variety of interpretations of the
depraved murder concept.30

23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
24. Id. § 210.2(1)(b). As defined in section 2.02,
[a] person acts recklessly . . . when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of
the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor’s situation.
Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
25. According to Model Penal Code section 2.02,
[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of the offense when: (i) if
the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the
element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that
his conduct will cause such a result.
Id. § 2.02.
26. Id. § 210.3(1) (including recklessly committed criminal homicide in the definition of
manslaughter).
27. Id. § 210.2(1)(b).
28. O’Brien v. State, 45 P.3d 225, 231 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.2(1)(b) cmt. 4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
29. Michaels, supra note 1, at 789 (“It is hard to see how these words by themselves
provide more definite guidance than the common law’s ‘depraved and malignant heart . . . .’”).
30. See id. at 801 (“Despite widespread adoption of the Model Penal Code, and its mens
rea framework for most offenses, this framework has not been widely used to define unintended
murder.”).
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In 1985, Alan Michaels, later a professor of criminal law at Ohio
State University and author of numerous articles on the subject of
criminal mens rea, provided a degree of clarity by classifying the
divergent state approaches into four categories: objective
31
circumstances, degree of risk, multiple victim, and mens rea.
According to Michaels, the objective circumstances approach “uses
the offender’s physical conduct to distinguish murder from
manslaughter. Under this analysis, the jury focuses on the objective
circumstances surrounding the crime, not the actor’s attitude towards
32
his victim’s life.” Michaels points out that this approach has a
number of advantages, namely that it is relatively easy for the jury to
understand, it has precedent in other areas of the law, and it produces
33
reasonable results. Yet, by allowing the jury to rely on its sense of
what is objectively reasonable when making a determination, the jury
“may be led to decide by instinct, or worse, prejudice.”34 Considering
that this approach does not provide adequate “guidelines for
35
appellate control,” this drawback gains even more significance. The
objective standard is also inconsistent with general homicide
principles, which rely on mental states to differentiate various grades
of murder.36
Departing slightly from the objective circumstances approach,
the degree of risk methodology “limits extreme indifference murder
to cases in which the actor’s deed created a particularly significant
37
chance of causing a death.” Like the objective scheme, the degree of
risk approach is easy to comprehend.38 Simplicity may not compensate
for its underinclusiveness, however, as it fails to cover situations that
appear to demonstrate a depraved indifference to life, such as a game
of Russian roulette in which there is less than a 50 percent chance
that a bullet will discharge.39 Professor Nourse strongly disapproves of
this approach, arguing that although “focusing on ‘risk’ for depraved
heart murder seems like a neutral, more precise, calculus . . . it

31. Id. at 790–94.
32. Id. at 790 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 793.
34. Id. at 794–95.
35. Id. at 795.
36. Id. at 794.
37. Id. at 791 (citation omitted).
38. See id. at 797 (“Risk is a straightforward concept easily expressed in mathematical
terms.”).
39. Id. at 798.
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quickly becomes a rationalization for our judgments, not a means to
40
them.”
Professor Nourse prefers to interpret depraved indifference
41
murder according to what Michaels calls a multiple victim approach.
“Under a multiple victim analysis, a defendant is guilty of unintended
42
murder only if his reckless act endangers more than one individual.”
Michaels indicates that, again, the advantage of this approach lies in
its simplicity. Limiting depraved indifference murder to situations
endangering more than one person’s life creates a bright-line rule that
prevents prosecutors and juries from convicting a defendant of
depraved indifference murder for a crime that appeared to
intentionally target a particular victim.43 This clarity comes, however,
with the cost of underinclusiveness.44
Michaels’ last category of interpretive approaches to depraved
indifference murder is mens rea. “Th[e] ‘mens rea’ approach stresses
that the characterization of an unintended killing as murder depends
on the actor’s mental state. The offender who does not care if his
45
victim lives or dies receives the murder sanction.” This approach is
the only one of the four that focuses on the individual defendant’s
actual indifference to human life. It is also the methodology that most
closely resembles the grading scheme in other areas of homicide law,
which are differentiated by referring to the actor’s actual mental
state.46 This approach suffers from similar drawbacks as the common
law “depraved heart” interpretation, however, because it does not
provide any guidance on evaluating a defendant’s mental state. In the
absence of a definition of “extreme indifference to the value of

40. Nourse, supra note 14, at 386.
41. Id. at 386 (“Th[e] focus on the individual must be false or at least incomplete; we don’t
live in bubbles or on islands. People commit crimes against others; and it is the relation between
the ‘other’ and the ‘defendant’ that informs most of our judgments about the relative
blameworthiness of the parties.”).
42. Michaels, supra note 1, at 792.
43. Id. at 799 (“The seductiveness of the multiple victim approach lies in the clear limits it
places on which homicides can be treated as murder, and the protection these limits afford
against abuses of the doctrine at the hands of courts, prosecutors, and juries.” (citation
omitted)).
44. See id. at 799 (“By restricting unintended murder to cases where many people are
threatened, this approach denies that an unintended killing can ever be as bad as murder if it
threatens only one or two individuals.”).
45. Id. at 792.
46. Id. at 800.
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47
human life” in the Model Penal Code, a mens rea approach must
provide standards by which to evaluate a defendant’s subjective state
of mind to avoid a constitutional vagueness challenge.48
Of these methodologies, Michaels argues that the mens rea
approach is optimal because it accords with the utilitarian49 and
50
retributive theories of criminal law. Yet, he also recommends an
alternative theory that, he argues, would address the problems
inherent in the mens rea approach. His suggestion involves a
counterfactual inquiry into “whether the actor would have committed
the act had he known it would cause a death.”51 Michaels argues that
this standard would combine focusing on the actor’s state of mind
with the ease of interpretation that makes the objective
circumstances, degree of risk, and multiple victim approaches
desirable schemes of interpretation.52
Although Michaels provides a useful classification system for the
variety of methodologies used among the states, he ignores many of
the practical realities that shape a state’s interpretation of depraved
indifference murder. Through the use of a largely theoretical analysis,
Michaels recommends a counterfactual inquiry that he claims is free
of the conceptual shortcomings that detract from the other
interpretive methodologies.53 This Note, however, demonstrates that
no single approach can work across all jurisdictions because of the
different practical realities among the states. The practical realities of
each state—combined with Michaels’ theoretical considerations—
provide a framework for states to choose an interpretive

47. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
48. See Michaels, supra note 1, at 800 (“Without a standard more specific or concrete than
‘extreme indifference to human life’ to guide the jury, the approach suffers from the vagueness
and potential for confusion that plague the objective circumstances approach.”).
49. Id. at 803 (“Reckless actors are in turn more dangerous than ‘negligent’ actors, who
take unjustified risks in ignorance. Utility therefore justifies harsher sanctions for intentional
than for reckless killings, and harsher sanctions for reckless killings than for negligent ones.”).
50. Id. at 804 (“An individual who intends to kill a person shows a more fundamental
disrespect for that person’s autonomy than someone who, in pursuit of some other goal, is
merely willing to create a chance of killing a person. . . . A reckless killer, in turn, displays a
greater lack of respect, and hence commits a greater wrong, than the actor negligently unaware
that he is putting life at risk.”).
51. Id. at 807.
52. See id. at 807–08 (“In a sense, the suggested mens rea analysis adopts parts of the other
approaches to unintended murder.”).
53. See id. at 808 (“By sharply defining a criterion for unintended murder, this approach
successfully resolves classic problem cases where other approaches fail.”).
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methodology that best fits the unique circumstances of their
jurisdictions.
II. SUMMARY OF STATE INTERPRETATIONS OF
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER
The broad range of approaches to depraved indifference murder
that has developed reinforces the conclusion that no single
interpretation can be adequately implemented across all jurisdictions.
This Part furthers this point by illustrating the practical consequences
that result from a state’s choice of interpretive methodology. An
examination of these consequences provides a useful framework for
each state to consider when selecting a definition of depraved
indifference murder that corresponds with its practical realities.
A comparison of the approaches taken by various states between
1985 and 2006 leads to the results summarized in Figure 1.54
Figure 1. Depraved Murder Approaches in 1985 and 2006
1985
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Evaluating the different state approaches according to Michaels’
classification scheme indicates that there has been a noticeable shift
toward the degree of risk methodology, a slight increase in the mens
rea approach, and a slight decline in the objective circumstances
approach. The significant increase in the number of states relying on a
54. The 1985 chart is based on the division of approaches summarized by Michaels, supra
note 1, at 792 nn.23, 27, 30 & 32, 801 nn.87 & 90. Additionally, the “common law” category
contains those states that have a depraved indifference murder statute, but interpret it based on
the “depraved heart” language of the common law.
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degree of risk methodology is likely the result of a shift toward an
approach that measures the degree of risk according to defendants’
55
subjective knowledge that their actions create a grave risk of death.
To evaluate this shift in a more comprehensive manner, this Part
examines the approaches taken by the thirty-six states that apply the
concept of depraved indifference. This classification of interpretations
is divided into seven groups, rather than the four used by Michaels.
The additional categories include states that continue to interpret
their depraved indifference murder statute in accordance with the
“depraved heart” and “malice aforethought” language of the
common law, as well as those that have adopted the language of the
Model Penal Code commentary to section 210.2(1)(b).56 Also, the
degree of risk approach is subdivided into two categories to
differentiate those states that view the risk created by defendants’
conduct objectively, and those that require defendants to have been
subjectively aware of the risk of death created by their conduct. With
the exception of the states that follow the Model Penal Code
commentary, the additional classification indicates that the
approaches are split relatively evenly among the thirty-six states, as
indicated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Depraved Murder Approaches in 2006
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In addition to summarizing the number of states that adhere to
each approach, this Part analyzes the consequences of following a

55.
56.

See infra Part II.C.
See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
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particular interpretive methodology. For example, a state may
interpret its depraved indifference murder statute to address a
particular problem, only to find that this choice of methodology is
producing unwanted consequences that render the interpretive
57
scheme less desirable. Knowledge of these potential consequences,
however, assists a state in choosing the optimal interpretive approach
for its jurisdiction.
A. Objective Circumstances
Seven of the thirty-six states take an objective circumstances
approach to depraved indifference murder.58 Four of these seven
states use an objective circumstances interpretation in cases involving
59
intoxication. Thus, whether or not these states adopted objective
circumstances approaches for the purpose of minimizing the use of
intoxication defenses, these leading cases reveal that the objective
circumstances approach is particularly effective in preventing
individuals from avoiding conviction through this defense. By
objectively evaluating a defendant’s extreme indifference to life and

57. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.
58. The states that follow an objective circumstances approach are Florida, New
Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Duckett v.
State, 686 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“An act is one ‘imminently dangerous to
another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life’ as follows: (1) a person of
ordinary judgment would know is reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to
another, and . . . (3) is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human
life.” (quoting FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 66)); State v.
Cunningham, 880 P.2d 431, 439 n.13 (Or. 1994) (“It is not the ‘circumstances’ that manifest
extreme indifference but rather it is the conduct of a defendant that manifests his or her
extreme indifference.” (quoting State v. Boone, 661 P.2d 917, 919 n.8 (Or. 1983))); State v.
Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1108 (R.I. 1992) (“Thus, the nature of the killing alone demonstrates
recklessness of consequence and a wanton disregard for the sanctity of human life . . . .”); State
v. Laible, 594 N.W.2d 328, 333 (S.D. 1999) (“The trial court correctly instructed that ‘whether
conduct is imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human
life is to be determined from the conduct itself and the circumstances of its commission.’”);
West v. Commonwealth, 597 S.E.2d 274, 281 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he Commonwealth
presented evidence that ‘the conduct of the driver constitutes a great departure from that of a
reasonable person . . . which creates a great risk of injury to others and where by the application
of an objective standard the accused should have realized the risk created by his conduct.’”
(quoting Keech v. Commonwealth, 386 S.E.2d 813, 817 (Va. Ct. App. 1989))); State v. Jensen,
613 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Wis. 2000) (“However it is proven, the element of utter disregard for
human life is measured objectively, on the basis of what a reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would have known.”). For a detailed discussion of New Hampshire’s use of the
objective circumstances approach, see infra Part III.A.
59. Duckett, 686 So. 2d at 662; State v. Dufield, 549 A.2d 1205, 1205 (N.H. 1988), 549 A.2d
at 1205; Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1103; West, 597 S.E.2d at 278.
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requiring a mens rea of only recklessness, these states preclude
defendants from arguing that their intoxication prevented them from
60
forming the requisite intent to kill.
Two of these seven states grade depraved indifference homicide
as manslaughter rather than murder.61 This indicates a legislative
judgment that the reduced mens rea requirement of recklessness for a
depraved indifference killing should not be graded at the same level
as a murder in which the defendant had a subjective intent to kill the
victim. Finally, the depraved indifference statutes in four of the seven
states adhering to the objective approach use common law “malice
aforethought” language, as opposed to the four mental states outlined
62
in the Model Penal Code. This result is in accordance with Professor
Nourse’s claim that “[d]epraved heart murder is fundamentally about
indifference to others. The depraved heart murderer is someone who
fails to do something that all of us do every day to those who are
immediately before us . . . .”63 Thus, these four common law
jurisdictions evaluate depraved heart murder by an objective
standard, according to whether the reasonable person would view the
defendant’s actions as displaying indifference to others.
B. Degree of Risk—Objective Standard
Six states adhere to a degree of risk approach and evaluate the
64
degree of risk using an objective standard. Of these six states, four

60. Dufield, 549 A.2d at 1207.
61. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1) (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36.1(B) (2004).
62. See Duckett, 686 So. 2d at 663 (“The elements for second-degree murder . . . are as
follows: ‘. . . (3) There was an unlawful killing of (victim) by an act imminently dangerous to
another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life.’” (quoting FLA. STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 66)); Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1105 (“[P]roof of malice is
a required element of second-degree murder.”); Laible, 594 N.W.2d at 332 (“Homicide is
murder in the second degree when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to others and
evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life . . . .” (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2216-7 (2006))); West, 597 S.E.2d at 282 (“[A]ppellant’s actions constituted behavior so gross,
wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life.”).
63. Nourse, supra note 14, at 378.
64. The states that follow a degree of risk approach evaluated objectively are Arizona,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and North Dakota. See State v. Valenzuela, 984
P.2d 12, 14 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (“Second-degree murder . . . results when, without
premeditation, one ‘recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death,’ under
circumstances ‘manifesting [an] extreme indifference to human life . . . .’” (alteration in original)
(quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1104(A)(3) (2006))); State v. Witham, 876 A.2d 40, 42
(Me. 2005) (“In a prosecution for depraved indifference murder the State is not required to
prove that the defendant was subjectively indifferent to the value of human life, but rather that
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65
have applied this standard to cases involving intoxication, indicating
that this approach is also effective in preventing defendants from
relying on an intoxication defense. Although the objective degree of
risk approach may help to prevent intoxication defenses, it may
classify murders demonstrating intent to kill as depraved indifference
murder. This problem prompted the Court of Appeals of New York
to change its interpretation of the state’s depraved indifference
murder statute in People v. Feingold.66
Among the states that applied an objective degree of risk
approach to depraved indifference homicide, one classified the
67
68
offense as reckless endangerment, one classified it as manslaughter,
69
and four characterized such a killing as murder. Like the objective
circumstances approach, these varied classifications are likely a result
of the reduced mens rea requirement for depraved indifference under
an objective degree of risk approach. In contrast to the objective
circumstances approach, however, the majority of states that rely on
an objective degree of risk methodology use Model Penal Code

his conduct, objectively viewed by a reasonable person, manifested a depraved indifference to
the value of human life.” (quoting State v. Dodd, 503 A.2d 1302, 1305 (Me. 1986)));
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 840 N.E.2d 954, 959 (Mass. 2006) (“[M]alice, for purposes of this
theory of murder, also includes an intent to do an act that in the circumstances known to the
defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain and strong likelihood that
death would follow.”); People v. Goecke, 579 N.W.2d 868, 879 n.25 (Mich. 1998) (“Most
depraved-heart murder cases do not require a determination of the issue of whether the
defendant actually was aware of the risk entailed by his conduct . . . .”); State v. Bakka, 826 A.2d
604, 612–13 (N.J. 2003) (“The phrase under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
human life does not focus on the defendant’s state of mind but rather on the circumstances
under which you find he acted. If, in light of all of the evidence, you find that defendant’s
conduct resulted in a probability as opposed to a mere possibility of death, then you may find
that he acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.”); State v.
Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364, 369 (N.D. 1977) (“The statute is graded, then, according to the
severity of the risk created.”).
65. Valenzuela, 984 P.2d at 13; Oliveira, 840 N.E.2d at 957; Goecke, 579 N.W.2d at 871;
Bakka, 826 A.2d at 607–08.
66. People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 2006); see infra notes 135–38 and
accompanying text.
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-03 (1997).
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(a)(1) (West 2005).
69. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1104(A)(3) (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 201(1)(B) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007); see
Commonwealth v. Chhim, 851 N.E.2d 422, 430 (Mass. 2006) (noting that murder, as defined by
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, §1, is unlawful killing with malice; and that “[m]alice is . . . an intent to
cause death, to cause grevious bodily harm, or to do an act which, in the circumstances known to
the defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain and strong likelihood that
death would follow”).
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70
language to define depraved indifference. This result follows
logically from the Model Penal Code’s definition of depraved
indifference, which refers to recklessness and to the risk created by
71
the defendant’s conduct.

C. Degree of Risk—Subjective Standard
Five states follow a degree of risk approach, but evaluate the risk
subjectively according to the defendant’s state of mind.72 Although
Michaels combined this approach with the objective degree of risk
approach, significant differences between the two approaches—both
in their interpretation of depraved indifference murder and the
consequences that result from this interpretation—merit distinction.
The five states following the subjective degree of risk approach assess
the defendant’s indifference to life based on the subjective awareness
of the risk created by the defendant’s conduct. Whereas the Utah
Supreme Court and the Alaska legislature require that the
defendant’s awareness of the risk rise to the level of “knowledge,”73
the other states following this approach simply state that the
74
defendant must be “subjectively aware” of the risk. Although it is
unclear whether these states require awareness to rise to the level of
knowledge or merely recklessness, they nevertheless interpret the risk

70. See sources cited supra notes 67–69. Arizona, Maine, New Jersey, and North Dakota
use Model Penal Code language, whereas Massachusetts and Michigan rely on a common law
description.
71. See supra note 24.
72. The states that follow a degree of risk approach evaluated subjectively are Alaska,
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont. See State v. Johnson, 720 P.2d 37, 39 n.6 (Alaska
1986) (“The state has since conceded the correctness of the court of appeals’ holding that
subjective awareness of the risk is required under AS 11.41.110(a)(2).”); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Ky. 2005) (“[Wantonness] . . . presupposes an awareness
of the creation of substantial homicidal risk, a risk too great to be deemed justifiable by any
valid purpose that the actor’s conduct serves.” (alteration in original) (quoting KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507.020 (West 2006))); Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360, 364 (Pa. 2005) (“[O]ur
courts have consistently held that malice is present under circumstances where a defendant did
not have an intent to kill, but nevertheless displayed a conscious disregard for ‘an unjustified
and extremely high risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily harm.’” (quoting
Commonwealth v. Young, 431 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. 1981))); State v. Brunell, 615 A.2d 127, 130–31
(Vt. 1992) (“The difference between the implied intent to kill (‘depraved heart‘) required for
second-degree murder, and the criminally negligent conduct for involuntary manslaughter, is
the defendant’s awareness of the risk and the degree of that risk.”). For a detailed discussion of
Utah’s use of the degree of risk approach evaluated subjectively, see infra Part III.D.
73. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(2) (2006); see infra Part III.D.
74. See supra note 72.
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of the defendants’ conduct according to their state of mind, rather
than an objective standard akin to a probability calculation.
Two interesting differences appear between the states that follow
a subjective degree of risk approach and those that maintain an
objective degree of risk approach. First, all five subjective degree of
risk states grade the depraved indifference statute as murder, rather
75
than manslaughter. This indicates that states are more comfortable
grading a depraved indifference killing as murder because there is a
mens rea element to the offense. Second, only one of the five cases
defining the states’ subjective degree of risk approach involved
intoxication.76 The other four included unintentional killings such as
77
78
an inadvertent shooting, a car accident, and a case involving a
79
shaken baby. Rather than preventing improper intoxication
defenses, these subjective degree of risk cases involved unintentional
killings with the focus on defendants’ awareness of the risk of death
created by their conduct. Like the objective degree of risk approach,
more states following the subjective degree of risk approach use
Model Penal Code language instead of common law language.80 Given
the MPC’s definition of recklessness and emphasis on mens rea,81 this
result is not surprising.
D. Multiple Victim
Five of the thirty-six states adhere to a multiple victim
approach.82 In these states, a defendant’s act demonstrates a depraved
75. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(2) (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(b) (West
2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(c) (West Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5203(2)(c) (1998 & Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (1998).
76. Johnson, 720 P.2d at 37.
77. Santos, 876 A.2d at 361.
78. Brown v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 421, 423 (Ky. 2005).
79. State v. Brunnell, 615 A.2d 127, 128 (Vt. 1992).
80. See sources cited supra note 75. Alaska, Kentucky, and Utah use MPC language, while
Pennsylvania and Vermont rely on the common law description of depraved heart murder.
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
82. The states that follow a multiple victim approach are Alabama, Colorado, Minnesota,
New Mexico, and Washington. See Ex parte Williams, 838 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Ala. 2002)
(“‘Reckless murder’ or, as it is sometimes called, ‘universal malice murder’ . . . requires the
prosecution to prove conduct that manifests an ‘extreme indifference to human life,’ any human
life.” (quoting Ex parte Simmons, 649 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Ala. 1994) (per curiam))); State v.
Hanson, 176 N.W.2d 607, 614 (Minn. 1970) (“The offense as defined by Minn. St.
609.195 . . . excludes a situation where the animus of defendant is directed towards one person
only.” (citation omitted)); State v. Dunbar, 817 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Wash. 1991) (“Under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he engages in conduct which
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indifference to life only if it puts the lives of more than one person at
83
risk. A defendant’s endangerment of more than one life, however,
does not prevent a conviction for the depraved indifference murder of
a particular victim. Two of the cases falling under this category of
interpretation involved the prosecution of a defendant for an
unintentional shooting. In these cases—one involving the death of an
84
innocent bystander during a gunfight, and the other resulting from
an accidental shooting while the defendant was playing with a
revolver85—the defendant’s conduct endangered more than one life,
even though there was only one victim.
Despite the relatively equal distribution between Model Penal
Code and common law language in these statutes, reliance on a
multiple victim approach demonstrates a preference to adhere to the
common law notion that “[o]ne who committed what we would today
call the classic idea of a depraved heart murder . . . was an ‘enemy to
86
all mankind,’ and thus guilty of malice.” The multiple victim
approach indicates that individuals are guilty of depraved heart
murder when their conduct demonstrates indifference—not just to
one life, but to human life in general—thus demonstrating what the
Colorado Supreme Court described as “universal malice.”87
Although a multiple victim approach may lead to a smaller
number of convictions for depraved indifference murder,88 the graded
severity of the offense for those convicted under this approach was
the harshest of all of the categories. All five states employing a
multiple victim analysis graded depraved indifference killings as
89
murder. Three of these states—Colorado, Washington, and New

creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person . . . .”
(quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(b) (West 2006))). For detailed discussions of
Colorado and New Mexico’s use of the multiple victims approaches, see infra Parts III.C and
III.E.
83. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
84. Ex parte Williams, 838 So. 2d at 1029.
85. State v. Reed, 120 P.3d 447, 450–51 (N.M. 2005).
86. Nourse, see supra note 14, at 375 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *200).
87. People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223, 1233 (Colo. 1988).
88. This is because conduct that endangers the life of only one person is excluded from the
coverage of the statute. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
89. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(2) (Supp. 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(d) (2006);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(a) (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(3) (2004); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(b) (West 2000).
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90
Mexico—classify the offense as first-degree murder. This indicates
these states’ view that murders demonstrating “universal malice” on
the part of the defendant are just as reprehensible as premeditated
intentional murders.

E. Mens Rea
Six states interpret their depraved indifference murder statutes
according to a mens rea approach, based on the defendant’s actual
91
indifference to human life. This interpretive scheme focuses on
defendants’ states of mind, rather than the objective circumstances
surrounding their actions. This approach resembles the subjective
degree of risk approach in emphasizing defendants’ mental states.
The two schemes differ, however, in that the mens rea approach
focuses on the defendant’s subjective indifference to life, whereas the
subjective degree of risk approach focuses on defendants’ subjective
awareness of the risk created by their reckless conduct.
Four of the six states following a mens rea approach use Model
92
Penal Code language in their depraved indifference murder statutes.
Given the MPC’s emphasis on mens rea and its implementation of
default mental states for those statutes in which a mental state is not

90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(d) (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(3) (2004);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(b) (West 2000).
91. The states that adhere to a mens rea approach are Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, and New York. See McCoy v. State, 69 S.W.3d 430, 435 (Ark. 2002)
(“[T]he phrase ‘under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life’ indicates that the attendant circumstances themselves must be such as to demonstrate the
culpable mental state of the accused.” (quoting Martin v. State, 547 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Ark. 1977)));
People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 748, 755 (Cal. 2003) (“[M]alice is now deemed implied ‘when the
killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life,
which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life
of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’” (quoting People v. Dellinger, 783
P.2d 200, 202 (Cal. 1989))); State v. McMahon, 778 A.2d 847, 854 (Conn. 2001) (“This court
concluded that the mental state required for a violation of § 53a-55(a)(3) was clear.
‘Recklessness involves a subjective realization of a risk and a conscious decision to ignore that
risk.’” (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Bunkley, 522 A.2d 795, 804 (Conn. 1987))); Bridges v.
State, 706 A.2d 489, 491 (Del. 1998) (“Bridges cannot reasonably be heard to argue that he was
prejudiced by the admission of evidence bearing on a state of mind reflective of ‘depraved
indifference to human life.’” (emphasis added)); Alston v. State, 662 A.2d 247, 248 (Md. 1995)
(“Should death to one of the innocent bystanders or homeowners ensue, each participating in
the lethal encounter has exhibited the mens rea that qualifies him for depraved-heart murder.”).
For a detailed discussion of New York’s adoption of the mens rea approach, see infra Part III.B.
92. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-103(a)(1) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-55(a)(3)
(West 2001); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 635(1) (Supp. 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(1)
(McKinney 2004).
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93
enumerated, the mens rea category understandably includes more
states with MPC language than any of the other six categories. As a
result, states with depraved indifference statutes consisting of MPC
language are likely to impose a mens rea standard for each element of
the crime, including the requirement that the defendant’s act display
“extreme indifference to the value of human life.”94
Five of the six states in the mens rea category classify depraved
indifference killings as murder rather than manslaughter.95 Like the
96
subjective degree of risk approach, this grading scheme indicates
that states are more inclined to penalize a depraved indifference
killing as murder if the defendant was subjectively indifferent to the
life of the victim.
Finally, none of the leading cases utilizing a mens rea approach
involved a murder committed while the defendant was intoxicated.
97
Instead, these cases addressed such issues as accidental shootings
98
and “shaken baby” deaths. Although these cases examined the
defendant’s subjective mental state, enabling the court to analyze
whether the defendant’s state of mind rose to the level of depraved
indifference, they did not address concerns regarding the use of
voluntary intoxication defenses to avoid conviction for depraved
indifference murder.

F. Common Law
Five states rely on the common law’s “depraved heart” and
“malice aforethought” language to interpret depraved indifference
murder.99 The approach taken by these states does not fit within any

93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
94. Id. § 210.2(1)(b).
95. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-103(a)(1) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999 &
Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 635(1) (Supp. 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2204(a) (LexisNexis 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney Supp. 2007).
96. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
97. Alston v. State, 662 A.2d 247, 248 (Md. 1995).
98. Bridges v. State, 706 A.2d 489, 490 (Del. 1998).
99. The states that follow the language of the common law are Georgia, Mississippi,
Nevada, North Carolina, and Oklahoma. See Sheffield v. State, 635 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ga. 2006)
(“[A] malice murder can be shown . . . by evidence that the defendant acted where no
considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart.” (quoting Parker v. State, 507 S.E.2d 744, 747 (Ga. 1998)));
Clark v. State, 693 So. 2d 927, 930 (Miss. 1997) (“[I]n a ‘depraved heart’ murder, malice can be
inferred from the circumstances if the actions involved a very high degree of carelessness
evincing a reckless indifference to the danger of human life.” (citing Windham v. State, 602 So.
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of the preceding categories, as the courts in these cases did not
indicate whether a “depraved heart” is established through subjective
evidence of defendants’ mental state or objective evidence of the
circumstances or risks created by their actions. Similar to the
subjective degree of risk and multiple victim approaches, all five
states in the common law category grade depraved indifference
100
killings as murder rather than manslaughter.
The variety of factual circumstances among the cases in this
category indicates the flexibility of the common law’s “abandoned
and malignant heart” approach to depraved indifference murder. One
case dealt with an automobile accident death resulting from the
101
driver’s intoxication, whereas others addressed death by child
102
abuse, a reckless shooting,103 and strangulation.104 This broad range
of factual circumstances reflects how the common law approach
effectively encompasses all aspects of depraved indifference murder
rather than focusing on one particular problem, such as the use of
intoxication defenses. With this broad coverage, however, comes the
disadvantage that the common law “depraved heart” standard is
often vague and difficult to define.
G. Model Penal Code Section 210.2(1)(b) and Commentary
The seventh and final category of approaches consists of two
states that interpret depraved indifference according to the language

2d 798, 802 (Miss. 1992))); Collman v. State, 7 P.3d 426, 449 (Nev. 2000) (en banc) (“[M]alice
shall be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all circumstances of the
killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.020
(West 2006))); State v. Miller, 543 S.E.2d 201, 206 (N.C. 2001) (“Another kind of malice arises
when an act which is inherently dangerous to human life is done so recklessly and wantonly as
to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent
on mischief . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Mooney v. State, 990 P.2d 875, 886 (Okla. Crim. App.
1999) (“Second degree murder is defined as a homicide ‘perpetrated by an act imminently
dangerous to another person and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although
without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual . . . .’” (quoting
Willingham v. State, 947 P.2d 1074, 1081 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997))).
100. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(a) (2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(b) (2006); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.020, 200.010 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17 (West Supp. 2006);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.8(1) (West 2002).
101. Miller, 543 S.E.2d at 203–04.
102. Collman, 7 P.3d at 430–32.
103. Clark, 693 So. 2d at 929.
104. Sheffield, 635 S.E.2d at 777.
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105
of Model Penal Code section 210.2(1)(b) and its commentary. These
states let the trier of fact determine whether the defendant’s
“recklessness rose to the level of ‘extreme indifference to the value of
106
human life.’” Both cases dealt with an unprovoked beating—one
resulting in death and a murder conviction,107 and the other resulting
in serious injury and a conviction for aggravated assault and battery.108
Like the common law approach, the rationale used by both of these
courts does not comport with any of the preceding categories because
the MPC fails to provide a conclusive definition of “extreme
indifference.” Allowing the trier of fact to determine whether the
defendant acted with extreme indifference has the advantage of
providing the flexibility to cover a wide variety of factual
circumstances, as seen with the common law methodology. Yet
relying solely on the Model Penal Code and its commentary could
lead to the development of an “I know it when I see it”109 approach
that is subject to the prejudices of the trier of fact.

III. REASONS FOR THE STATES’
INTERPRETATIONS OF DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER
Summarizing the variety of approaches to depraved indifference
murder and the practical consequences that stem from these
approaches provides a useful background to guide a state when
selecting an interpretive methodology. For a state to adopt the most
appropriate interpretive approach to depraved indifference murder, it
must examine how these various approaches correspond to the
unique circumstances of its particular jurisdiction. Examining the
formulation of the depraved indifference murder statutes in New

105. The two states following the Model Penal Code commentary are Kansas and Wyoming.
See State v. Robinson, 934 P.2d 38, 47 (Kan. 1997) (“[T]he legislature intended for the depraved
heart murder statute to carry a higher degree of culpability than the reckless involuntary
manslaughter statute, thereby making the two statutes distinguishable. This intent is further
supported by the commentary to the Model Penal Code . . . .”); O’Brien v. State, 45 P.3d 225,
231–32 (Wyo. 2002) (“By adopting the Model Penal Code’s term, ‘recklessly,’ to justify a lesser
punishment for assault and battery, the Wyoming Legislature plainly intended to distinguish
between ‘recklessly’ and ‘recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life’ in the same manner as had the Model Penal Code.”).
106. O’Brien, 45 P.3d at 232.
107. Robinson, 934 P.2d at 42.
108. O’Brien, 45 P.3d at 227–28.
109. The “I know it when I see it” approach comes from Justice Potter Stewart’s famous
standard for determining obscenity. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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Hampshire, New York, Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico reveals that
the underlying reasons for a particular state’s interpretation of its
depraved indifference murder statute are not limited to an assessment
of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages summarized by
110
Michaels and Nourse.
As indicated by then–New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice
111
David Souter in State v. Dufield, some states interpret their
depraved indifference murder statutes on the basis of practical
112
reality. For example, New Hampshire and New York relied on an
objective interpretation of their depraved indifference murder
statutes out of concern that a subjective interpretation would open
113
the door to voluntary intoxication defenses. Although this continues
to be the approach in New Hampshire, New York has switched to a
mens rea approach to rectify the problems that its objective degree of
risk approach was causing with regard to double-count indictments.114
Legislative action also influences state interpretations of
depraved indifference murder. The New Mexico legislature’s decision
to include two depraved indifference murder statutes in its criminal
115
code resulted in the state supreme court’s flexible interpretation.
Colorado and Utah provide two more examples that illustrate the
116
interplay of the legislature and the judiciary. In People v. Jefferson,
the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a 1981
amendment to its depraved indifference murder statute, which
inserted the element of “universal malice.” And in State v. Fontana,117
the Utah Supreme Court had to infer a mens rea element as a result
of legislative action that was motivated by reference to constitutional
challenges made in Colorado.118 The following examples indicate that
states do not select a method of interpretation based entirely on
theoretical advantages and disadvantages; they also consider the
practical realities of their jurisdictions.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See supra notes 31–48 and accompanying text.
State v. Dufield, 549 A.2d 1205 (N.H. 1988).
See infra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 120–30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131–38 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.E.
People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1988).
State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).
See infra Part III.C–D.
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A. New Hampshire
New Hampshire’s objective circumstances approach to depraved
indifference murder is illustrated by Justice Souter’s state supreme
court opinion in State v. Dufield. Dufield brutally murdered his
extremely intoxicated sister by stabbing her with a screwdriver and a
119
pair of scissors. He appealed his conviction for reckless seconddegree murder, arguing that his intoxication prevented him from
being able to form the requisite mental state of “extreme indifference
120
to the value of human life.” To address the defendant’s voluntary
intoxication defense, Justice Souter discussed the appropriate method
for interpreting New Hampshire’s reckless murder statute.121 He
noted that if the statute required the defendant’s subjective
122
indifference to life, he might have a valid intoxication defense. If the
defendant’s “extreme indifference to the value of human life” was
interpreted according to an objective approach, however, “any
voluntary intoxication that might have blinded a defendant to the
risks of such extremely deviant behavior would be as irrelevant as it
would be to proof of the less culpable deviation required to establish
mere recklessness.”123
Justice Souter opted for the objective approach as the result of
“practical consequences . . . and the policy underlying the statutory
124
treatment of disregarding risks of harm to others.” The practical
consequences involved the difficulty of providing a clear instruction
to the jury in a case involving a voluntary intoxication defense if
reckless murder was interpreted by a subjective standard.125 Jusice
Souter felt that jurors would not be able to follow such an instruction

119. State v. Dufield, 549 A.2d 1205, 1206 (N.H. 1988).
120. Id.
121. Section 630:1-b(I)(b) of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes requires that, for reckless
second-degree murder, the death be caused “recklessly under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to the value of human life.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b(I)(b) (2007).
122. Dufield, 549 A.2d at 1206.
123. Id. at 1207.
124. Id.
125. See id. (“The judge would begin by explaining that a defendant is responsible for the
consequences of creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death of which he is entirely
unaware by reason of voluntary intoxication, but only to the extent that the disregard of that
risk by a sober person, aware of the circumstances, would not have exceeded a gross deviation
from the norm of law-abiding conduct. The judge would then have to charge that the jury
should nevertheless consider evidence of voluntary intoxication in deciding whether the
circumstances in which the defendant acted manifested a state of extreme indifference to the
value of human life.”).
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126
as the distinction it draws “would seem irrational.” He also opted
for an objective interpretation as a result of his finding that
“consistent policy” required that voluntary intoxication be precluded
as a defense for reckless second-degree murder, because section 2.08
of the Model Penal Code excludes voluntary intoxication defenses for
crimes involving a mens rea of recklessness.127

B. New York
128

In People v. Register, the New York State Court of Appeals
129
adopted an objective degree of risk approach. Like the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in Dufield, the court of appeals took this
approach to prevent the use of intoxication defenses to second-degree
depraved indifference murder.130 Though this interpretation solved
New York’s intoxication defense problem, it created complications
for the court of appeals over the next twenty-three years. First, the
use of a degree of risk approach blurred the line between seconddegree murder and manslaughter because of the vague distinction
between the “grave risk of death”131 necessary for a murder conviction
and the “substantial and unjustifiable risk of death”132 required for
reckless manslaughter.133 The court of appeals holding in Register also
created the practical problem of prosecutorial ease in charging
depraved indifference when the killing resulted from the defendant’s
intent to kill rather than indifference to life. For example, although
murder indictments fell 50 percent between 1989 and 2001, depraved
indifference charges doubled, and double-count indictments rose
from 14 percent to 56 percent.134

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1983). The defendant in this case brought a
loaded pistol to the bar where he and a friend were drinking, and he shot the victim following an
argument. Id. at 705.
129. Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Depraved Indifference Prosecutions in
New York: Time for Substantive and Procedural Clarification, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 455, 466–67
(2005).
130. See id. (“Register claimed that his drunken state left him unable to engage in the
wantonness and depravity necessary to sustain a murder charge.”).
131. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney Supp. 2007).
132. Id. § 125.15(1).
133. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 129, at 468 (“[A]n entirely objective
construction of depraved indifference would eliminate the distinction between second degree
manslaughter and depraved indifference murder.”).
134. Id. at 477.
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The court of appeals attempted to remedy these problems in a
135
line of cases culminating with People v. Feingold, a reckless
endangerment case in which the court explicitly overruled Register by
136
adopting a mens rea approach to depraved indifference murder.
The court went on to state that “depraved indifference is best
understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life—a
willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one
simply doesn’t care whether harm results or not.”137 As a result, the
interpretation of New York’s depraved indifference murder statute
shifted from an objective degree of risk analysis to a mens rea
analysis. This change should eliminate the ability of prosecutors to
charge a defendant for both intentional and depraved indifference
murder, because the two offenses have mutually exclusive mental
states that cannot be charged in the same indictment.138
C. Colorado
Prior to 1972, Colorado’s depraved indifference first-degree
139
murder statute reflected a codification of the common law. The
statute was amended in favor of Model Penal Code language,
providing “[i]f ‘[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life,’ a person ‘intentionally
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death . . . and
thereby causes the death of another,’ that person committed firstdegree murder.”140 Following this amendment, the distinction between

135. While attempting to commit suicide by inhaling gas from his stove, the Feingold
defendant caused an explosion that destroyed the walls of his apartment and damaged those of
his neighbors. People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (N.Y. 2006); see also supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
136. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d at 1167 (“[D]epraved indifference to human life is a culpable
mental state.”). The court addressed the depraved indifference murder statute in this case
because section 120.25 of the New York Penal Law states that a person violates the reckless
endangerment statute “when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human
life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of risk to another person.” Id. at
1164.
137. Id. at 1168 (quoting People v. Suarez, 844 N.E.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. 2005) (per curiam)).
138. Id. at 1166 (“[I]ndifference to the victim’s life . . . contrasts with the intent to take it.”
(quoting People v. Payne, 819 N.E.2d 634, 635 (N.Y. 2004))).
139. See John C. Steele, Comment, Extreme Indifference Murder: The Impact of People v.
Marcy, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 83, 87 (1982) (“A 1963 statute defined murder as ‘the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied.’” (quoting COLO.
REV. STAT. § 40-2-1 (1963))).
140. Id. at 88 (emphasis and first alteration added) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3102(1)(d) (1973)).
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141
first- and second-degree murder was that the intent required for
first-degree murder was a form of “aggravated recklessness”142 that
reflected a “universal malice.”143
Five years later, the Colorado legislature removed
“intentionally” from both the first- and second-degree murder
statutes in favor of “knowingly.”144 This change caused the Colorado
Supreme Court to invalidate the depraved indifference murder
statute in People v. Marcy.145 In that case, the defendant brought an
equal protection claim, alleging that the first- and second-degree
146
murder statutes were indistinguishable. Because the Colorado
Supreme Court could no longer distinguish the two statutes on the
basis of the “universal malice” that made first-degree murder a
general intent crime,147 it struck the first-degree murder statute down
on equal protection grounds.148
Following this decision, the Colorado legislature in 1981
amended the depraved indifference murder statute to read:

A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if . . .
[u]nder circumstances evidencing an attitude of universal malice
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life
generally, he knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to a person, or persons, other than himself, and thereby
149
causes the death of another.

141. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-103(1)(a) (1973) (providing that a person commits seconddegree murder if “[h]e causes the death of a person intentionally, but not after deliberation”).
142. Steele, supra note 139, at 89 (quoting Joseph R. Quinn, Homicides under the Colorado
Criminal Code, 49 DENV. L.J. 137, 153 (1972)). Justice Quinn also authored the opinion in
People v. Marcy, discussed infra note 145 and accompanying text.
143. Steele, supra note 139, at 89 (quoting Quinn, supra note 142, at 152).
144. Id. at 90. The amendment was the result of an effort to ensure that both first-degree
depraved indifference murder and second-degree murder would be interpreted as general intent
crimes, in order to avoid the use of an intoxication defense. See id. at 89–90 n.44 (“Since
extreme-indifference murder involved ‘universal malice,’ not directed at any one person, Rep.
Gorsuch and Chief Justice Moore felt it should be amended from ‘intentionally’ to
‘knowingly’ . . . .”).
145. People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981).
146. Steele, supra note 139, at 91.
147. Id. at 92 (“Prior to 1977, when the original language of the 1972 Criminal Code was still
in effect, the Colorado Supreme Court had upheld extreme-indifference murder . . . . rel[ying]
on the distinction between general and specific intent.”).
148. See id. at 94 (“Since the required mental states were equivalent and the ‘extreme
indifference’ language possessed no ‘independent significance,’ the court could discover ‘no
rational basis’ for distinguishing the two statutes.”).
149. Id. at 101 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(d) (Supp. 1982)) (emphasis added).
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People v. Jefferson represented the first challenge to the multiple
victim approach embodied in this amended statute. After
documenting the history of amendments to Colorado’s depraved
indifference first-degree murder statute, the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld the amendment. The court found that “[t]he 1981 amendment
reaffirmed the element of cold-bloodedness, as represented by the
phrase ‘under circumstances evidencing an attitude of universal malice
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life
generally.’”150 The court held that this distinction sufficiently
overcame the equal protection challenge because first-degree
depraved indifference murder relates to conduct “which is not
directed against a particular person at all.”151 Thus, after extensive
amendments, again in an attempt to avoid voluntary intoxication
defenses,152 Colorado explicitly codified the multiple victim approach
to depraved indifference murder that had always been the basis of its
distinction between first- and second-degree murder.
D. Utah
In 1973, Utah amended its depraved indifference murder statute
from a codification of the common law to language that mirrored the
Model Penal Code section 210.2(1)(b).153 In 1979 the Utah legislature
sought to create a clear distinction between its depraved indifference
murder and reckless manslaughter statutes by deleting the word
“recklessly” from its depraved indifference murder statute.154 The
amendment was a reaction to a 1974 Colorado Supreme Court
decision155 that upheld Colorado’s depraved murder statute against a
constitutional challenge asserting there was no distinction between
156
the mental state required for first- and second-degree murder.

150. People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223, 1231 (Colo. 1988) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 183-102(1)(d) (Supp. 1982)).
151. Id. at 1233.
152. Steele, supra note 139, at 89–90 n.44 (“[S]econd-degree murder was a specific-intent
crime and thus vulnerable to a defense of intoxication.”).
153. Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 131, 152 (1985).
154. Id. at 153.
155. People ex rel. Russel v. Dist. Court, 521 P.2d 1254 (Colo. 1974).
156. Recent Developments in Utah Law, supra note 153, at 153 n.151 (“[D]espite the
favorable ruling, the Utah Association of Prosecutors asked the legislature to delete ‘recklessly’
from the Utah statute, fearing that the Utah Supreme Court might declare Utah’s statute
unconstitutional for similar reasons.”).
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Because this amendment did not replace “recklessly” with
another mens rea element, the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Fontana held that its depraved indifference statute no longer referred
to a subjective mental state and that the court would need to imply
157
158
one. As a result of its decision in State v. Bindrup, the court
159
rejected “recklessly.”
It also feared that a mental state of
“intentionally” would lead to “the second degree murder conviction
of a person who intentionally engages ‘in conduct that in fact create[s]
a grave risk of death to another, even without proof that the actor
160
[knows] of the risk.’” As a result, the Utah Supreme Court settled
on a mens rea of “knowingly.”161
162
In State v. Standiford, the Utah Supreme Court upheld its
decision in Fontana, finding that “to be convicted [of depraved
indifference murder], a defendant must know the nature of his
conduct, must know the circumstances that give rise to the risk of
death, and must know that the risk constitutes a grave risk of
death.”163 In addition to this mens rea requirement, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the term “depraved indifference to human life”
164
should be interpreted according to an objective standard. In other
words, to be convicted of depraved indifference murder under Utah’s
subjective degree of risk approach, defendants must act knowingly in
creating a grave risk of death, and their conduct, when viewed
objectively, must evince a depraved indifference to human life.165

157. Id. at 154.
158. State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982).
159. Id. at 676 (“The 1979 amendment of the statute in question makes it clear that reckless
conduct is not sufficient to prove the offense of murder in the second degree.”).
160. Recent Developments in Utah Law, supra note 153, at 154 n.162 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Utah 1984)).
161. Id. at 154 (“In the context of depraved indifference murder, the court held that the
burden is met if the prosecution shows that the defendant ‘acted with knowledge that his
conduct created a grave risk of death to another.’” (quoting Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1046)).
162. State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).
163. Id. at 263.
164. Id. at 261 (“The term ‘depraved indifference to human life’ does not refer to the mens
rea, or subjective culpable mental state, of depraved murder, but rather to an objective
reasonable person standard as to the value of human life.” (citation omitted)).
165. See id. at 264 (“In sum, the jury should be instructed that to convict of depraved
murder it must find (1) that the defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a grave risk of death,
(3) that the defendant knew the risk of death was grave, (4) which means a highly likely
probability of death, and (5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and indifference
toward human life.”).
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E. New Mexico
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Reed166
167
differs from the other opinions discussed in that it permits review of
the multiple victim approach contained in its first-degree depraved
indifference murder statute by either an objective or subjective
standard. The court held:
[A] person guilty of depraved mind murder may not intend the
specific result of death, but is equally culpable because that person
intentionally commits ‘an act imminently dangerous to others’ or
does so ‘with the subjective knowledge that the act creates a very
high degree of risk to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind
168
regardless of human life.’

This alternative interpretation results from the similar language used
in New Mexico’s first- and second-degree murder statutes. Firstdegree depraved murder requires that the defendant’s act is “greatly
dangerous to lives of others,” whereas the second-degree murder
statute prohibits acts that create “a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm . . . .”169 As seen in New York following Register,
the difference between “greatly dangerous” and “a strong
probability” is difficult to distinguish, and the New Mexico Supreme
Court had to differentiate these two statutes.170
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This summary illustrates the rich complexity of the depraved
indifference murder concept. As evidenced by the five states
discussed in Part III, the wide variety of practical realities that
influence states’ interpretations of depraved indifference murder
makes it virtually impossible to assign a single definition that
effectively meets the needs of all thirty-six states that recognize the

166. State v. Reed, 120 P.3d 447 (N.M. 2005).
167. See supra Part III.A–D.
168. Reed, 120 P.3d at 455 (quoting State v. Brown, 931 P.2d 69, 75 (1996)).
169. Leo M. Romero, Note, Unintentional Homicides Caused by Risk-Creating Conduct:
Problems in Distinguishing Between Depraved Mind Murder, Second Degree Murder,
Involuntary Manslaughter, and Noncriminal Homicide in New Mexico, 20 N.M. L. REV. 55, 61
(1990) (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(3), (B) (1984)).
170. See id. (“The courts’ attempts to distinguish between depraved mind murder and
second degree murder have used the number of persons exposed to the risk and a subjectiveobjective knowledge distinction.”).
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depraved indifference concept. Further, the consequences arising
from such an interpretive decision demonstrate the need for
individual jurisdictions to base their choices on their particular
circumstances. For example, both New York and New Hampshire
initially decided to interpret their depraved indifference murder
statute objectively.171 Although New Hampshire continues to adhere
to the objective circumstances approach, New York switched to a
mens rea approach because of the drastic increase in double-count
indictments charged by prosecutors across the state.
Despite previous attempts to provide a comprehensive, effective
definition of depraved indifference for the entire United States, the
concept of depraved indifference does not lend itself to such an exact
designation. Although a theoretically consistent interpretation is
possible, differences in practical realities among the states prevent
such a uniform classification. This Note does not attempt to design
one “correct” approach to depraved indifference murder. Instead, the
examples throughout this Note identify important practical
considerations and provide a framework for interpreting the practical
reasons and consequences that shape a state’s interpretive approach
to depraved indifference murder. A close examination of these
examples reveals three practical considerations that are particularly
important in shaping the way a state interprets its depraved
indifference murder statute.
First, when selecting an interpretive methodology, a state must
identify the factual scenario that its depraved indifference murder
statute targets. For example, states concerned with the use of
voluntary intoxication defenses to avoid depraved indifference
murder convictions should adopt an objective approach to depraved
indifference murder.172 States that are more concerned with punishing
unintentional killings as murder, however, should adopt an approach
that focuses on the defendant’s subjective mental state, such as the
173
mens rea or subjective degree of risk approach. New York’s
experience with its depraved indifference murder statute174 indicates
the importance of these factual issues. States selecting an interpretive
methodology must consider the potential costs created by targeting a
particular factual scenario. If these costs outweigh the benefits of
171.
172.
173.
174.

See supra Part III.A–B.
See supra Part II.A–B.
See supra Part II.C and E.
See supra Part III.B.
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preventing the targeted factual scenario, then the state should opt for
an alternative interpretation. New York initially desired to interpret
its depraved indifference statute to protect against intoxication
defenses, but the costs associated with this interpretation, in the form
of double-count indictments, became excessive. To rectify this
problem, New York adopted the mens rea approach.
Second, the felony grading of depraved indifference murder can
influence a state’s choice of interpretive approach. States that grade
depraved indifference homicide as manslaughter should follow an
objective circumstances approach because the mens rea requirement
of recklessness is significantly lower than that necessary for a murder
conviction.175 This is the approach adopted in Oregon and Virginia.176
States grading depraved indifference homicide as murder, however,
should adopt an interpretive approach that considers defendants’
state of mind, such as the mens rea or subjective degree of risk
approach.177 States opting to classify depraved indifference homicide
as first-degree murder, such as Colorado, should choose to follow a
multiple victim approach in order to ensure that defendants convicted
of depraved indifference murder demonstrate “universal malice.”178
Additionally, the experiences of Colorado and Utah illustrate that
states following an interpretive approach that involves the
defendant’s subjective mental state must distinguish the mens rea
required for depraved indifference murder from other degrees of
murder.179
Finally, a state’s use of Model Penal Code or common law
language in its statute influences its choice of interpretive
methodology. For example, states using MPC language in their
depraved indifference murder statutes tend to opt for either of the
degree of risk approaches, given the MPC reference to recklessness in
180
its definition of depraved indifference. The mens rea approach
would also be appropriate, given the MPC’s enhanced focus on the
181
States using common law “malice
defendant’s mental state.
aforethought” language should follow the objective circumstances

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1)(a) (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36.1(B) (2004).
See supra Part II.C and E.
See supra Part III.C and part II.D.
See supra Part III.C–D.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22–23 and accompanying text.
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approach. This interpretive approach accords with the common law
definition of depraved indifference murder as an unintentional killing
182
that contravenes societal norms. States wishing to adopt a more
flexible approach to depraved indifference murder that provides the
courts with a large amount of discretion should define depraved
indifference murder according to the “depraved heart” language of
183
the common law or the Model Penal Code commentary.
These practical considerations are not intended to supplant the
theoretical issues identified by Michaels. Instead, they serve as
additional factors to shape a state’s choice of interpretive
methodology. After a state has decided which theoretical approach to
depraved indifference murder it prefers, it should then consider the
unique practical realities of its jurisdiction. Considering the three
factors outlined in this Part will ensure that a state’s interpretive
approach is well suited to the realities of its jurisdiction, thus enabling
its depraved indifference murder statute to operate effectively.
CONCLUSION
To aid states in future efforts to interpret their depraved
indifference murder statutes, this Note provides a framework by
which states can make a more informed decision regarding their
definitions of depraved indifference murder. When coupled with the
theoretical considerations highlighted by Alan Michaels, this Note’s
examination of the reasons behind each state’s choice of interpretive
approach, as well as the consequences that result from such schemes,
enables states to select a definition of depraved indifference murder
that best fits their unique practical realities. For example, Larry
Feingold’s suicide attempt184 provided the New York Court of
Appeals with the opportunity to change the interpretation of the
state’s depraved indifference murder statute and correct the problems
associated with double-count indictments.185 Yet had the court of
appeals been aware of the practical considerations highlighted in this
Note when it made its decision in People v. Register, perhaps this
correction would not have been necessary. If the court was aware of

182.
183.
184.
185.

See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.F–G.
People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (N.Y. 2006).
See supra Part III.B.
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the costs associated with an objective interpretive approach, it might
have opted for the mens rea approach back in 1983 instead of 2006.

